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In the Name of Anthills and Beehives: An inquiry 
into the concept of rights of nature and its 
reasoning
En el nombre de hormigueros y colmenas: Una investigación sobre el concepto de los 
derechos de la naturaleza y su razonamiento
Jingjing Wu
Tilburg University, Países Bajos
ABSTRACT In this paper, I first investigate rights of nature legislation in Ecuador 
and Bolivia, namely the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008, Bolivia 
Law of the Rights of Mother Earth 2010, and the Framework Law of Mother 
Earth and Integral Development for Living Well 2012. I apply a two-pronged 
analytical approach to these legal texts, which investigates the characteristics 
of such rights and the logic of the supporting reasoning. By reading into the 
legal texts, I argue that: (a) the characteristic of rights of nature as codified in 
these legislation is human (fundamental) rights; and (b) the main reasoning 
to support such right-status is spiritual reasoning that is largely based on the 
indigenous cosmovision. I then turn to some iconic declarations on human 
rights and natural rights theories, which shows the concept of “human rights” 
is almost impenetrable when it comes to the idea of “human”. I conclude this 
paper by indicating that in order to give rights of nature a solid ground in our 
current legal systems, we have to rethink the ground of human rights. 
KEYWORDS Human rights; indigenous cosmovision; rights of nature.
RESUMEN En este artículo, doy cuenta en primer lugar de la legislación sobre 
derechos de la naturaleza en Ecuador y Bolivia, a saber, la Constitución de la 
República del Ecuador de 2008, y las leyes de derechos de la Madre Tierra de 
2010 y la ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien de 
2012 en Bolivia. Se aplicó un doble enfoque analítico a estos textos jurídicos, 
con el propósito de investigar las características de tales derechos y la lógica de 
razonamiento que los apoya.
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Como resultado del doble análisis realizado, en segundo lugar, sostengo 
que: (a) lo que caracteriza la codificación de los derechos de la naturaleza en 
estos textos jurídicos son los derechos humanos (fundamentales); y que (b) 
el principal razonamiento para apoyar dicho estatus de derechos es uno de 
tipo espiritual basado en gran medida en la cosmovisión indígena. En tercer 
lugar, presento algunas declaraciones icónicas sobre los derechos humanos y 
las teorías de los derechos naturales, que muestran que el concepto de "dere-
chos humanos" es casi impenetrable cuando se trata de la idea de lo "humano". 
Concluyo este artículo indicando que para dar a los derechos de la naturaleza 
una base sólida en nuestros sistemas legales actuales, tenemos que repensar la 
base de los derechos humanos.
PALABRAS CLAVE Derechos humanos; indígenas cosmovisión; derechos de la 
naturaleza.
Introduction
This paper is an attempt to study arguably one of the most important developments 
in the current legal discourses: That is giving nature or natural objects rights. The fact 
that several countries in South America and Oceania have already put this idea into 
national legislation suggests that rights of nature may become one of the fundamental 
legal values in the near future1.
However, this new and fast-expanding legal enterprise faces many challenges from 
both theoretical and practical perspectives. For instance, the Indian Supreme Court 
has suspended the highly praised Uttarakhand High Court decisions (No. 126 of 2014. 
20 March 2017), which granted the rivers Ganga and Yamuna legal personality and 
fundamental rights. According to the Indian Supreme Court, the order is, among 
others, beyond the jurisdiction of the Uttarakhand High Court (No(s). 016879/2017). 
As I have argued elsewhere (Wu, 2017), this Supreme Court’s decision might have a 
more solid legal ground than the well-praised Uttarakhand High Court’s original or-
der. This invokes the question: on what ground do we give nature rights? 
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1. By the time of writing, for the national level legislation on rights of nature, there are: Constitution 
of the Republic of Ecuador 2008, Bolivia Law of the Rights of Mother Earth 2010, and the Frame-
work Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living Well 2012, New Zealand Te Urew-
era Act 2014 and Te Awa Tupua Act 2017. As for the legislation concerning rights of nature that is 
at a sub-national level, there are, for instance, 2006 Tamaqua Borough in Pennsylvania, which is the 
first in the world to legitimise rights of nature. For court rulings, in 2016, Colombia’s Constitutional 
Court ruled that the Rio Atrato possesses rights to “protection, conservation, maintenance, and 
restoration,” and established joint guardianship for the river shared by indigenous people and the 
national government. In 2017, Indian Uttarakhand’s high court issued an order giving rivers Ganga 
and Yamuna fundamental rights and legal personality, which, however, is currently suspended by 
the Indian Supreme Court.
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In order to answer this question, in this paper, I apply a two-pronged analytical 
approach to the national legislation regarding rights of nature in Ecuador and Bolivia. 
The reasons to focus on these two countries are not only that they are the first coun-
tries in the world passed rights of nature legislation on a national level, but that they 
also have a similar historical, political, and cultural background regarding legitimi-
sing rights of nature, which makes the analysis representative and concise. The two-
pronged analytical approach investigates: (a) the characteristics of rights of nature, 
and (b) the reasoning that supports these rights. I will argue respectively that: the cha-
racteristics of rights of nature are similar to fundamental rights; the main reasoning 
to support such rights status is indigenous spiritual reasoning. I then investigate the 
ground for granting human rights in the current legal systems by turning to some ico-
nic human rights declarations and natural rights theories, which poses challenges as 
well as gives inspirations in terms of bestowing nature fundamental rights. I conclude 
this paper by indicating that in order to give rights of nature a solid legal ground, we 
need to rethink the foundations of human rights as well. 
Status of the debate and the scope of the current discussion
So far, legal research on rights of nature can be categorised into four approaches: legal 
personality, legal practice, constitutionalism, and ecocentrism. Legal personality ap-
proach positions rights of nature as an operative legal term with little normative con-
notation (see, e.g. Boyed, 2017; O'Donnell & Talbot-Jones, 2018; Stone, 1972, 2010). 
Legal practice approach focuses on environmental legal practice, especially on court 
cases that invoke rights of nature. (see, e.g. Kauffman & Martin, 2016; O'Donnell & 
Talbot-Jones, 2018; Pecharroman, 2018). Constitutionalism approach puts rights of 
nature legislation against the background of constitutionalism, usually focusing on 
the environmental clause of a Constitution (see, e.g. Kotzé & Calzadilla, 2017; Kotzé, 
2016). Ecocentrism approach contrasts eco-centric with anthropocentric legal sys-
tems, arguing in favour of the former over the latter (see, e.g. Borràs, 2016; Grear, 
2015; Knauß, 2018). Legal personality and practice approaches focus on the applica-
tion of the law, whereas constitutionalism and ecocentrism approaches take a more 
conceptual route. From another perspective, legal personality and constitutionalism 
discuss the characteristics of rights of nature, whereas legal practice and ecocentrism 
analyse their legal impact (Table 1).
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Table 1. Four approaches to rights of nature legal research.
The Characteristics of Rights of Nature The Impact of the Legislation
Practical Legal Personality Approach Legal Practice Approach
Normative Constitutionalism Approach Ecocentrism Approach
In this article, I focus on one question: what does it mean by giving nature rights in 
the current legal orders, which are predominantly anthropocentric? Therefore, com-
menting on the normative battles and consequently siding with one group, although 
a tempting invitation, is not the concern of this article. This restraint of normative 
ambition is a trade-off for making the following investigation possible: what are the 
theoretical obstacles that hamper the implant of rights of nature in the current legal 
systems? What could we do about it here and now? 
Rights of nature legislation in Ecuador and Bolivia
In this part, I first compare rights of nature as codified in the Ecuador and Bolivia 
national legislation to the characteristics of fundamental rights. I then look into the 
main reasoning that supports such rights. Both sections are directly based on the re-
levant legal texts. In the last section of this part. I go beyond the legal texts and intro-
duce the constitutional debates (or judicial background) behind these legislation to 
see whether the intention of the texts indeed coincides with the meaning of the texts.
Rights of nature as fundamental rights 
To compare rights of nature with fundamental rights, we first need to understand 
what fundamental rights are. To answer this question, without digging into the rich 
discussion of fundamental rights, I use the definition from the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR)2, in which human rights3 are defined as universal, inalie-
nable, and indivisible. It is universal and inalienable because “[a]ll human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights” (Art. 1); whereas it is also indivisible in the 
sense that human rights are inherent to every human being and therefore cannot be 
positioned in a hierarchical order. Thus, I will use these three characteristics as the 
criteria to determine whether rights of nature in the national legislation of Ecuador 
and Bolivia live up to such standard. 
2. The reason I use this definition is that UDHR is the document that has universal value and en-
dorsement.
3. In this article, I use “fundamental rights” and “human rights” interchangeably, for “[t]he term 
fundamental rights is used in a constitutional context whereas the term ‘human rights’ is used in 
international law. The two terms refer largely to the same substance.” European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights https://fra.europa.eu/en/joinedup/about/what-are-fr (The websites cited in 
this article were last accessed on 16 May 2020).
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It is noted that a fundamental rights holder does not necessarily entitle a legal per-
sonhood, whereas a legal person most likely does not enjoy fundamental rights. The-
refore, this article should be separated from the scholarly discussion on nature’s legal 
personhood. A legal personhood is a legal operative status whose primary function 
is to assign rights and duties under a given legal system (Smith, 1928). Hence, funda-
mental human rights denote a normative status of the rights holders, whereas a legal 
person status connotes a legal capacity. They are, therefore, categorically different. 
While the debate on the relationship between fundamental rights and legal person-
hood is beyond the scope of the article, it suffices to say that the tests for determining 
whether rights of nature as codified in Ecuador and Bolivia legislation are funda-
mental rights or a legal personhood need to be done separately. This article will only 
conduct the test for fundamental rights.
Rights of nature in 2008 Ecuador Constitution
In 2008, Ecuador reformed its Constitution, including the codification of rights of 
nature, which makes it the first country in the world recognises rights of nature in 
its Constitution. The Constitution first indicates that “[n]ature shall be the subject of 
those rights that the Constitution recognizes for it” (Art. 10). Therefore, it recognises 
nature as a rights-holder without any precondition, which satisfies “universal” and 
“inalienable” characteristics. The specific rights that nature is subject to are further 
listed under Chapter Seven from Article 71 to 74. In general, it includes the right to 
exist and be defended (Art. 71); the right to restoration, without ignoring the rights of 
communities to integral reparations (Art. 72); the right to precaution and the applica-
tion of restrictions (Art. 73); the right not to be commodified and to allow human and 
community activities within the framework of sumak kawsay (Art. 74). The content 
of rights concerns the existence, maintenance, and regeneration of nature as a whole, 
hence “indivisible”. 
Rights of nature legislation in Bolivia
Right after Ecuador amended its Constitution, in 2010, Bolivia passed the Law of the 
Rights of Mother Earth (hereinafter referred to Law 071). Its single objective is “to 
recognize Mother Earth as a political subject enshrined with … rights” (See http://
www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/law/the-rights-of-mother-earth-law). In 2012, Bo-
livia passed The Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Li-
ving Well (hereinafter referred to Law 300), as a successor and an expanded version 
of Law 071.
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In Law 071, Bolivia declares that Mother Earth takes on the character of collective 
public interests and entitles it right to life, to bio-diversity, to water, to clean air, to 
equilibrium, to restoration, and to free from pollution (Art.7). Herein, to recognise 
Mother Earth as a subject as a whole is to take it as a subject that entitles universal 
and inalienable rights; whereas all the rights listed above demonstrate an indivisible 
nature. Furthermore, it states that “[t]he exercise of individual rights is limited by 
the exercise of collective rights in the living systems of Mother Earth. Any conflict 
of rights must be resolved in ways that do not irreversibly affect the functionality of 
living systems” (Art. 6).  Therefore, not only rights of nature are considered as funda-
mental rights under Law 071, they also have a “trump” position4—not only over other 
legal rights, but over individual (human) rights. This is a big step departing from the 
anthropocentric legal order and towards an eco-centric one. 
However, in Law 300, such progressive position is toned down. Although Law 300 
confirms the positive rights that are given to nature as established in Law 071, it also 
emphases the rights of the indigenous originary farmer nations and people and the 
intercultural and Afro-Bolivian communities (Art. 9 (2)), “the civil, political, social, 
economic and cultural rights of the Bolivian people for Living Well through integral 
development” (Art. 9(3)), and “[t]he rights of the rural and urban population to live in 
a fair, equitable and solidary society” (Art. 9 (4)). Therefore, it shows a more “human/
society-centred” approach than the “Mother Earth-centred” approach as in Law 071.
Although there is undeniable continuity between Law 071 and Law 300 and a con-
firmed guarantee for rights of nature in both laws, it is seen that in Law 300, the 
central ideal is shifted towards Living Well and integral development, instead of the 
rights-status of Mother Earth. It thus creates the possibility to balance the rights of 
Mother Earth with other goals such as Living Well and integral development. In this 
sense, Law 300 steps back from the eco-centric characteristics of Law 071 and stays 
in the anthropocentric logic. Nonetheless, this does not mean that under Law 300, 
rights of nature are not considered fundamental. Contrarily, just like human rights 
can be balanced against other human rights, rights of nature may also be balanced 
against human rights or other fundamental legal reasoning. Therefore, although Law 
300 put an anchor in the anthropocentric legal system, the “universal, inalienable, and 
indivisible” characteristics of rights of nature remain.  
On what ground? 
There are common principles that come across both countries’ rights of nature le-
gislation, which are all based on the indigenous cosmovision in the said country. The 
4. “Trump position” is understood in the Dworkinian sense. Dworkin (1984).
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most salient principles include: a) Pachamama (Mother Earth), b) Sumak Kawsay (Li-
ving in harmony with nature), and c) Vivir Bien (Living Well)5.   
Specifically, although Pachamama literally translated as Mother Earth, both coun-
tries’ legislation speaks of Pachamama as synonymous of nature (Sólon, 2018, p. 121). 
Pachamama having rights is equal to nature having rights. This understanding may 
be derived from the indigenous spiritual understanding that nature (Earth) has the 
higher spirit that human as part of the universal scheme resides. 
Sumak kawsay and vivir bien are two phrases that closely linked with each other. 
Sumak kawsay is an ancient Kichwa word, which means to live in harmony within 
communities, ourselves, and most importantly, with nature. The sumak kawsay way 
of living has permeated indigenous cultures for thousands of years, which is “em-
bedded in the ethical values of indigenous cultures” (https://www.pachamama.org/
sumak-kawsay). “Vivir Bien”— good living or living in harmony with nature—is also 
an idea that is deeply rooted in the indigenous philosophies, which affirms the need 
to live in harmony with Mother Earth and in equilibrium with all forms of life (Calza-
dilla & Kotzé, 2018, p. 403). Therefore, both concepts are based on indigenous culture 
and have a spiritual connotation. 
These three phrases form the main reasoning supporting rights of nature in the 
legislation, which could be seen from their appearance in the legal texts. First of all, 
in both countries’ legislation, Pachamama, being used interchangeably with “nature”, 
is the subject of rights. In the Preamble of the Ecuador Constitution 2008, it is said 
that: “[c]elebrating nature, the Pacha Mama, of which we are a part and which is vital 
to our existence…” In Chapter Seven, where rights of nature are codified, it starts with 
the expression “[n]ature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the 
right…” (Art. 71). As for Bolivia, “mother earth” is in the title of both legislation: (i) 
Law 071 of the Rights of Mother Earth of 2010 (Ley 071 de Derechos de la Madre Tie-
rra) and Framework Law 300 of Mother Earth and Integral Development for Living 
Well of 2012 (Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien). 
Similar to the legislation in Ecuador, “mother earth” is also the subject of the rights in 
both Law 071 and Law 300. 
For sumak kawsay and buen vivir, in the Preamble of the Ecuador Constitution, 
it states “[h]ereby decide to build: A new form of public coexistence in diversity and 
in harmony with nature, to achieve the good way of living, the sumak kawsay.” This 
is further confirmed in Section Two (Healthy Environment), where the rights of the 
population to have the “good way of living (sumak kawsay), is recognised” (Art.14). 
In the rest of the Constitution, sumak kawsay is also said to be guaranteed for the 
Amazon territory (Art. 250) and the underpinning of the overall development struc-
ture of the country (Art. 275). For Bolivia, before the two legislation, the 2009 Bolivia 
5. The specific spell of each word may vary in different indigenous communities.
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Constitution had already put to recognise ancestral principles, “especially those that 
underpin the Aymara culture, such as Vivir Bien or Suma Qamaña (living well)”, as 
“one of the ethical and structural principles of the state” (Calzadilla & Kotzé, 2018, p. 
403). These two phrases were followingly invoked in the first Articles of both Law 071 
and Law 300.
In sum, these three concepts and their corollary are all “based on the indigenous 
cosmovision” that “signifies living in complementarity, harmony and balance with 
Mother Earth and societies, in equality and solidarity and eliminating inequalities 
and forms of domination” (https://theredddesk.org/countries/laws/law-300-fra-
mework-law-mother-earth-and-holistic-development-living-well). These concepts 
are permeated in both countries’ rights of nature legislation and function as the main 
supporting arguments for granting nature fundamental rights. Moreover, these indi-
genous concepts are also seen as the alternative to the Western capitalism and neo-li-
beral way of development, which are mostly represented as the exploitative economy 
(Borros, 2017; Calzadilla & Kotzé, 2018; Gudynas, 2013). In this sense, these indige-
nous spiritual concepts function as a resistance to the anthropocentric explorative 
economy and development by grounding nature in law against human aggression. 
Nevertheless, supporting rights of nature with indigenous cosmovision is not as 
novel as one may incline to think. In fact, as elaborated later in this article, the origi-
nal rhetoric and arguments for supporting human rights are also religious. After all, 
spiritual reasoning may be the only reasoning that is ontologically strong enough to 
bestow fundamental rights. Therefore, the spiritual reasoning used in the above le-
gislation is another proof that rights of nature are comparable to fundamental rights. 
Constitutional debate on rights of nature 
This section dives into the constitutional debates and legislation background. It de-
monstrates that indigenous cosmovision is not only the rhetorical but epistemologi-
cal and even ontological support for legitimising rights of nature. More importantly, 
the link between the law and the indigenous culture is not only a speculation from 
reading the legal text but can be proved by the political and ideological influence of 
the indigenous communities in both countries during the legislating process. 
Constitutional debate on rights of nature in Ecuador
In 2006, Rafael Correa was elected president in Ecuador after a decade of political 
instability6. During the election, Correa has been seen as a figure “with high popula-
6. From 1996 to 2006, there were nine presidents in Ecuador for a decade. http://www.rulers.org/
rule.html#ecuador.
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rity among the indigenous and the poor” (Tanasescu, 2013, p. 846). In fact, since the 
early 1990s, the indigenous movement with its organisation Confederation of Indige-
nous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and its political arm—Pachakutik, has been 
a decisive electoral and political force. Therefore, it’s not surprising that indigenous 
communities continued their influence in drafting the 2008 Ecuador Constitution 
two years after the election. 
Although the indigenous representatives in the Constitutional Assembly were 
small, their influence was decisive (Tanasescu, 2013, p. 947). During the assembly, the 
first extensive debate on the rights of nature appeared in the official transcription for 
29th April 2008. The transcription shows that the chair of the day was Alberto Acos-
ta. Acosta was the President of Ecuador’s Constitutional Assembly and the lead archi-
tect of the 2008 Constitution. He is also a visionary, environmentalist, and economist 
who is eager to look for an alternative development approach for Ecuador. The 29th 
April debate on the rights of nature was under Roundtable 5 on natural resources and 
biodiversity. This roundtable was chaired by indigenous leader Mónica Chuji. Howe-
ver, during Roundtable 5, it was observed that the voice to support constitutionalising 
rights of nature was not strong enough to pass such motion. Acosta, therefore, moved 
this motion to Roundtable 1 under the theme Fundamental Rights (Tanasescu, 2013, 
p. 851). This move again proved the innate connection between rights of nature and 
fundamental rights. 
Another element that needs to be taken into account during the debate was that 
in late April, indigenous groups had lost their battle on rights to consent (which was 
only represented as rights to consultation in the Constitution). Rights of nature, 
therefore, became an important venue for indigenous groups to restrain the State’s 
power upon natural resources and aggression towards indigenous communities and 
their tradition.
Therefore, there is an apparent indigenous influence behind the agenda of rights 
of nature in the 2008 Ecuador Constitution. Such influence could be summarised as: 
rights of nature have their intellectual origins in the indigenous cosmovision7. Ac-
cording to an interview with Mari Margil (then associate director of the Community 
Environmental Legal Defense Fund (CELDF)), during the national assembly, the indi-
genous representatives had talked about rights of nature as strengthening collective 
rights (Tanasescu, 2013, p. 853). Such position only makes sense if one adopts the 
7. “…by a majority of those I interviewed that the rights of nature have their intellectual origin in 
indigenous tradition” (Tanasescu, 2013, p. 847). Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Tan-
asescu stated in his informative article that the Constitution is more a product of the political and 
economic resistance to the Western way of development than following the indigenous footsteps. 
However, I view these two positions cannot do without each other in this context.
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indigenous cosmovision to take nature as “one of us” and resists the Western modern 
dualism in terms of “us” (human) versus “other” (nature). Finally, such a standpoint 
further makes rights of nature an alternative approach to the capitalism and neo-
liberal development approach. In this sense, in Ecuador, rights of nature are indeed an 
indigenous resistance to the anthropocentric legal and political systems.
Legal and political background of rights of nature legislation in Bolivia 
In Bolivia, the political background is different yet still similar to Ecuador in terms of 
indigenous influence permeating the rights of nature legislation. 
Before the two rights of nature legislation, Bolivia passed a new Constitution un-
der its first indigenous President Evo Morales. The call for the establishment of a 
Constitutional Assembly essentially arose from a coalition of the largest indigenous 
and peasant organisations in Bolivia, which in 2004 formed the so-called Unity Pact 
(Pacto de Unidad) with the objective of ensuring their full participation in the cons-
titutional drafting process and in the future governance of the country (Calzadilla & 
Kotzé, 2018, p. 400). As a result, although there are no explicit rights of nature men-
tioned in the 2009 Bolivia Constitution, there is an expression on the protection of 
mother earth and a recognition of ancestral principles, especially those that underpin 
the Aymara culture, such as Vivir Bien and Suma Qamaña (Calzadilla & Kotzé, 2018, 
p. 400). 
On the other hand, there was an increasing frustration regarding Morales’ govern-
ment policies among indigenous groups after the 2006 election. Nevertheless, it was 
said that a soon reached consensus between the legislators and the social movements 
made a solid ground for eventually passing Law 071 (See https://therightsofnature.
org/bolivia-law-of-mother-earth).
However, two years later, Law 300 falls far behind the expectation of the indige-
nous communities in answering their requests for protecting mother earth via rights 
of nature. In fact, after Law 300 passed, the country’s two leading indigenous fe-
derations CONAMAQ and CIDOB (representing highland and lowland indigenous 
groups respectively) have disassociated themselves from the Mother Earth law, which 
they view as betraying the principles of vivir bien and the original declaratory legis-
lation. The new law, CONAMAQ argues, is about legitimising Morales government’s 
developmentalist agenda, not about rethinking the extractivist model or transitioning 
towards the alternative, more ecological, model of development (https://nacla.org/
blog/2012/11/16/earth-first-bolivia%25E2%2580%2599s-mother-earth-law-meets-
neo-extractivist-economy). This disassociation with Law 300 is a powerful demons-
tration that indigenous communities claim authorship of their cosmovision, which 
they may or may not grant the State to use as the source for legislating State law. 
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However, such disassociation does not show retrospectively in Law 300 as the indige-
nous cosmovision is kept in the legal text. 
In sum, with its first indigenous president elected in 2006, indigenous communi-
ties in Bolivia have put their impact on the rights of nature legislation. Although there 
seems to be a constant tension between the indigenous communities and Morales’ 
government in terms of how faithful the government represents indigenous inter-
ests and keeps its original promises to the indigenous communities, such tension, 
in a way, proves that indigenous communities in Bolivia have a proactive role in the 
government on issues that matter to the indigenous interests. Thus, similar with the 
case in Ecuador, such impact could be seen from: first, the intellectual roots of rights 
of nature are found in the indigenous cosmovision; second, the strong political in-
fluence of indigenous communities throughout the legislative process; and third, an 
open resistance from the indigenous communities to the Western, capitalism and 
neo-liberal methods of development.
It is also seen from the two countries’ legislation that rights of nature have their 
undeniable resembles with human rights both rhetorically and legally, which will be 
further investigated in the next part. 
Human rights and their reasoning: a natural rights theory's perspective
The rights discussion is arguably one of the richest fields of human knowledge con-
cerning law, politics, and ethics, to name a few. Despite the disagreements found in 
almost every aspect of rights, one thing those discourses have in common—up until 
now—is, as Gilbert (2018) puts it, “the concept of a right is close to an inescapable 
part of human condition” (p. 1). In other words, so far, fundamental rights are pos-
sessed by human and human only. Therefore, before we make the inquiry into the 
ground that gives nature fundamental rights, we may need to sort out the following 
question: what grounds human rights? This is perhaps too big a question to investiga-
te in its fullness in the current discussion. Some analytical strategies are thus needed 
in order to narrow it down to a feasible scope. In the following part, I will expound 
on this topic by first briefly investigating some iconic documents concerning funda-
mental human rights with a focus on the reasoning and grounding. I then follow the 
inspirations of the natural rights theory provided by Margaret MacDonald, for its 
representativeness, convincingness, and relevance with the current discussion.  
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Human rights declarations8 
We can, of course, trace back to time immemorial and find the evidence such as the 
concept of property rights and citizens of a polis, to get the inspirations for funda-
mental rights. However, those concepts are, at best, the sources for today’s thinking 
on rights, whereas the concept of human rights has largely evolved and departed from 
the Ancient and Middle Age times. Thus, in order to keep the discussion concise and 
relevant to our current legal context, I put the pinpoint at the Enlightenment era, 
which, by no coincidence, is also the era marks the start of the Anthropocene. Three 
iconic documents may be enough to illustrate the reasoning behind this prevailing 
ideology9 of rights as we know it today: i.e. American Declaration of Independence 
(1776), French Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen (1779), and later 
on, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948).
In the beginning of the American Declaration of Independence, it invokes “Laws 
of Nature” and “Nature’ God” as the source to entitle the American people to separate 
from the British Empire. Then it follows its most famous paragraph: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
Similarly, this spiritual sentiment can also be found, albeit less saliently, in the 
French Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen: 
The representatives of the French people, organized as a National Assem-
bly, …have determined to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, un-
alienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration, being 
constantly before all the members of the Social body, shall remind them 
continually of their rights and duties…
Hence, the important ideological sources for human rights seem to have the fo-
llowing reasoning in common: human beings have rights that are bestowed by natural 
law (or God). These rights are inalienable to human on the ground of being human. 
In a more contemporary and equally (if not more) important declaration that en-
tails universal human rights, UDHR states that: 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inaliena-
ble rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world, …
8. I use the term “declaration” with its speech act connotation (Searle, 2010).
9. I use “ideology” in a value-neutral way.
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Article 1 All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
Herein, human as being human replaces the reasoning of natural law (God) be-
comes the ground for human rights. Therefore, the spiritual connotation from the 
Enlightenment texts is taken away and replaced by “humanity”, which serves both as 
the start and the end of the logic circle (hence, a tautology). “Being human” is kept as 
the one and only ground for bestowing fundamental rights.
This leads to the next inquiry: what makes being human the ground for possessing 
fundamental rights?
An account of natural rights theory: human’s capacity to reason
Natural rights, which corresponds with the idea of natural law, can be traced back to 
Stoics and Roman jurists (MacDonald, 1984, p. 21).  The claim of natural rights is ba-
sed on the presumption that “men are entitled to make certain claims by virtue simply 
of their common humanity…” (MacDonald, 1984, p. 21). To say that human rights as 
ideology could be understood through the theory of natural rights is because the fun-
damental logic of human rights as addressed in the above declarations aligns with the 
one found in the natural rights theories. 
Where do natural law and rights come from? MacDonald’s answer is simple, re-
presentative, and elegant. In summary, the capacity of reasoning, according to Mac-
Donald, is the fundament for having natural rights according to natural law. This 
capacity is, by its full-fledged means, reserved to human being. MacDonald (1984) 
further argues that: “…the definition of ‘human being’ that every human being is, or 
must be, free—or possess any other ‘natural’ right through his freedom is ideal and 
not real. But the ideal as well as the actual is natural fact” (p. 22). In this sense, the 
tautology of rights is made sense under the light of natural law and natural rights. 
That is: human beings are building a society (or societies) on the basis of our capacity 
to reason in order to preserve and eventually fully align with such capacity. In a way, 
this tautology is inevitable. Just as social contract theorists have to assume there was 
a point before the contract established that granted the meaning and legitimacy to the 
social contract (MacDonald, 1984, p. 27), rights theorists have to assume there was a 
point before human’s capacity to reason (that differentiates human from non-human) 
that grants the meaning and legitimacy to human’s capacity to reason.  
Social contract theories may further argue that human being establishes, enters, 
and maintains this society by making social contracts with each other. In order to 
make such contract, each human being should be her own autonomy: not only be able 
to understand, represent, and express her own perseverance, but also her own desi-
res, awareness, and determination. That is, to put generally, the capacity to reason. 
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A recent theoretical endeavour that goes beyond (but based on) the social con-
tract theories and explains the importance of human’s capacity to reason in groun-
ding fundamental rights is provided by Margaret Gilbert. In her book Demands and 
Rights (2018), she made a profound case of the foundations of human rights. That is, 
as she eloquently argued, joint commitments. In order to make joint commitments, 
a sense of shared-subjectivity is required10. In order to build a shared-subjectivity, 
the capacity to reason is the key. Particularly, she explained why fundamental rights 
should be reserved to human being:
The exponents of the natural Rights of Man were trying to express what 
they deemed to be the fundamental conditions of human social life and 
government. And it is by the observance of some such conditions, I suggest, 
that human societies are distinguished from anthills and beehives (p. 32).
Herein, it suffices to say that nature, for its lack of such capacity in its full-fledged 
forms, may suffer from having a solid ground that grants it fundamental rights the 
same way as human beings. The spiritual reasoning that is used to support rights of 
nature, as shown from the previous analysis, may not sit well or even clash with our 
current grounding for fundamental human rights: human societies create the concept 
of human rights to preserve the capacity of being human, where does nature stand 
in this picture? Thus, the almost impenetrable concept of “human” in “human rights” 
certainly casts a shadow on the plausibility of giving nature fundamental rights. In-
deed, if we still bestow human rights on the basis of being human with human’s capa-
city only, giving rights to nature becomes unimaginable. 
Flip the argument: in order to give rights to nature, it is not enough to just legis-
late it by invoking spiritual reasoning—a new foundation and reasoning for human 
rights are also needed.  Otherwise, even we grant nature fundamental rights (as in 
Ecuador and Bolivia), whenever there is a call for balancing between rights of nature 
and other human rights (or even other anthropocentric reasoning, such as right to 
development), rights of nature would stand little chance. This has been proven by the 
new legislation and court cases occurred since the rights of nature legislation passed 
in both countries11.  
10. Or in Margaret Gilbert’s own term: shared intention.
11. For instance, right after the Ecuador 2008 Constitution, President Correa immediately launched 
a public campaign to pass a mining law that greatly expanded existing mining operations and ini-
tiated new sites, which was passed in January 2009. Later the same year, the government further 
proposed Water Law that similarly opposed the Constitutional rights for nature and indigenous 
communities (Kauffman & Martin, 2016). Other cases see, for instance, Tangabana Case; Paramos 
Condor Mirador case (http://www.thepetitionsite.com/888/727/673/support-rights-of-nature-ine-
cuador/).
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Nevertheless, we have already made the very first step towards this direction as 
seen in the two countries’ legislation on rights of nature. However, it is not yet the 
time to pat ourselves on the backs and praise a job well done. Far from it, the work 
left to do is equally (if not more) difficult than the work has been done: a new way of 
thinking—not only about nature but also about human rights and their foundation. 
Without being able to rethink human rights and give them a new foundation that is 
compatible with rights of nature, the latter can only remain as “lofty rhetoric” (Boyd, 
2018), with little to nil impacts on our current legal systems and human society.
Recap & conclusion
This paper starts with a two-pronged analysis of the rights of nature legal texts in 
Ecuador and Bolivia. It argues that the characteristics of rights of nature as codified 
in the legislation are comparable to human rights, and the reasoning to support such 
rights is largely based on the indigenous cosmovision—hence spiritual reasoning. 
Such rights status and their reasoning are not only proved from reading the legal 
texts, but also from the set intention found in the constitutional debates and legal/po-
litical legislative background in both countries. Because of such status and reasoning 
invoked, this paper further investigates the foundations of human rights by looking 
into some iconic human rights declarations and the natural rights theory proposed 
by Margaret MacDonald. The result is that human rights as we know it are based on 
being human with human’s capacity only, which is fundamentally incompatible with 
the motion to extend the subjects of fundamental rights to other non-human entities. 
This means in order to build rights of nature as a solid legal concept, not only more 
effort is called for to tend to its legal arguments, reasoning, and practices, but a re-
construction of the foundations of human rights is equally, if not more, important. 
In order to give trees, anthills, and beehives standing, we may need to rethink where 
should human stand. 
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